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Abstract 
In this paper, I discuss Richard Feldman’s article “Reasonable Religious 
Disagreement”. In his article, Feldman argues that “reasonable disagreement” is not 
possible between two “epistemic peers” who have shared all of their evidence. 
Regardless of whether Feldman’s argument is valid, the two requirements (being 
epistemic peers and sharing all their evidence) he sets for ruling out a disagreement as 
reasonable could be impossible to meet in the very situations he is writing about. I argue 
that in situations of religious disagreements, from the outset the parties involved have 
reason to judge each other not to be epistemic peers, and that there is some evidence in 
many religious disagreements that is both relevant to the disagreement and impossible to 
fully share. 
Key Terms: 
Epistemic Peers – two people who, given the same body of evidence, are equally likely to 
reach the same conclusion about a given proposition. 
Evidence – internal things, such as ideas or memories, which should (epistemically 
speaking) influence the attitude the owner has towards belief in a given proposition. 
Evidentialism – a system of belief justification that advocates belief in a given 
proposition if and only if that proposition is supported by the evidence.  
Reasonable Disagreement – a disagreement in which the parties have reached 
contradictory conclusions reasonably. 
Uniqueness Thesis – a body of evidence can support only non-contradictory propositions. 
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Introduction 
Under what circumstances can two people reasonably disagree? If I affirm some 
belief as true, I am logically committed to the position that anyone who believes 
something contradictory is mistaken. The person with whom I disagree could have come 
about the contradictory conclusion either reasonably or unreasonably. What if both of us 
have come to accept our conclusions reasonably? Richard Feldman has addressed this 
very issue at length. In his article “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” Feldman 
assesses the possibility of reasonable disagreement.1 He argues that when two people of 
roughly equal intellect and reasoning have shared all their evidence concerning a 
proposition, they cannot reasonably form contradictory beliefs about the proposition. 
Feldman’s argument hinges upon several definitions: he defines disagreement as a 
situation in which one person believes a proposition that another disbelieves. Two people 
are epistemic peers according to Feldman if they are about equal in terms of intellect, 
rationality, background beliefs, and are informed to about the same extent in whatever 
area they are to be considered epistemic peers. Feldman says that two people have shared 
their evidence when they have fully explained their reasons for their beliefs and withheld 
no relevant information.  
I question whether two people who disagree on fundamental issues like the 
existence of God should judge each other as epistemic peers and whether they can share 
                                                             
1 Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: 
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. 194‐214.  
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all of their evidence in religious disagreements. It will be my position that, while 
Feldman’s argument rules out reasonable disagreement between epistemic peers who 
have shared all their evidence, two people might have reason to not judge each other as 
peers in regards to religious beliefs when they disagree on certain things. I will also argue 
that two parties cannot always share all of their evidence in a religious disagreement. 
Cases in which peerhood cannot be established and important evidence cannot be shared 
avoid the argument Feldman sets forth to rule out reasonable disagreement. I will argue 
that religious disagreements can be examples of these problems. First, in Section I I will 
outline Feldman’s argument. Next, in Section II I will discuss whether someone who 
disagrees with you about certain religious beliefs has reason to be judged as not an 
epistemic peer. After that, in Section III I will argue that evidence in religious 
disagreements cannot always be shared. Finally, in Section IV I will tie the arguments 
together and make a judgment about religious disagreements. 
Section I 
 First, a good understanding of Feldman’s argument is in order. Feldman’s 
argument is simple enough, but there are many terms and ideas in his writing that deserve 
some explanation. Firstly, Feldman is an evidentialist. Evidentialism as employed by 
Feldman is a system of belief justification that states a person is justified in believing a 
proposition if and only if that proposition is supported by the evidence at the time of 
belief.2 Evidentialism, argued for by writers such as William Clifford in his article, “The 
                                                             
2 Feldman is precise in the way he approaches justification; he is always writing about whether someone is 
justified at a specific moment in time. 
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Ethics of Belief,” is a widely held system of epistemic belief justification.3 Feldman also 
supports the uniqueness thesis. The uniqueness thesis, as Feldman proposes it, says that a 
given body of evidence cannot support contradictory propositions. Given the uniqueness 
thesis, reasonable4 disagreement is not possible between two epistemic peers who have 
shared all the evidence. If two epistemic peers were sharing the same evidence, and only 
non-contradictory propositions could reasonably be supported from that evidence, then it 
would not be possible for either of those peers to reasonably reach a conclusion that 
contradicted one reached by the other. For a reasonable disagreement, at least one party 
would have to be withholding evidence or be making a mistake in reason. So, a 
reasonable disagreement between two epistemic peers who have shared all their evidence 
is impossible for Feldman. Two people can reasonably disagree, but never when the 
evidence is fully shared between epistemic peers. 
In regards to disagreement Feldman writes about attitudes towards a proposition. 
For Feldman, only one of three epistemic attitudes towards a proposition can be justified 
by a given body of evidence: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment. If the body of 
evidence is, for example, concerning the existence of God, either there is reason enough 
to believe that God does exist, reason enough to believe that God does not exist, or the 
evidence is counter-balanced. In cases where the evidence is counter-balanced, suspense 
of judgment is (according to Feldman) the correct attitude. Suspending judgment means 
                                                             
3 Clifford, William. “The Ethics of Belief”. Philosophy of Religion Selected Readings. Ed. Peterson, 
Michael; Hasker, William; Reichenbach, Bruce; Basinger, David.  New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 99-104. Feldman and Clifford are both evidentialists, but they are certainly 
different breeds. Clifford never separated the ethics of believing something and the epistemic justification 
thereof. Feldman, on the other hand, is writing about two distinct things and when he writes about beliefs 
he is referring purely to the epistemic justification someone does or does not have. 
4 Feldman always means “reasonable” in the evidentialist sense, as to whether the evidence supports the 
belief. 
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withholding belief one way or the other.  From a body of evidence, multiple conclusions 
may be drawn, but none of these will be conflicting – all cases of mutual exclusivity will 
result in only one mutually exclusive claim being adopted. A body of evidence 
concerning competing cable companies might justify multiple propositions, like a belief 
as to which company has the lowest prices, or which company has the most channels, but 
never will any of these conclusions be contradictory (for instance, it could not support the 
propositions, “Company X has the most channels,” and, “Company Y has the most 
channels”).  
 Feldman makes his case with religious disagreements in mind – disagreements 
involving religious propositions. He aims to show that for disagreements about questions 
such as, “Does God exist?” there can be only one reasonable conclusion reached by two 
epistemic peers sharing all their relevant evidence. Specifically, if an atheist and a theist 
were to sit down, given the right conditions and amount of time, if they are epistemic 
peers and share all of their evidence concerning the existence of God, they ought to reach 
a point where they cannot reasonably disagree about the matter – one or both of them 
must change positions. 
 Feldman writes at length about evidence, but what does he mean by the term? In 
“Evidence,” Timothy McGrew writes about evidence as always being evidence of 
something.5 If a fingerprint is evidence, then it is evidence of something, like a murder or 
a robbery. Feldman writes about evidence as reason for believing something. Usually 
when we think of evidence, we imagine a courtroom and exhibits. When Feldman writes 
                                                             
5 McGrew, Timothy. “Evidence”. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Ed. Bernecker, Sven and 
Pritchard, Duncan. P 58. 
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about evidence, he means something less physical. For Feldman, evidence is a term for 
all the reasons someone has for believing a proposition. In a courtroom, a document, the 
testimony of an eye-witness, or a ballistics report might be considered evidence. The two 
uses are not synonymous. While someone may form a belief based on something like a 
document or the testimony of a witness, the physical document or the actual testimony of 
that person wouldn’t really be that person’s evidence for Feldman.6 Those things cannot 
be carried around everywhere and shared with other people. Instead, the memory, 
interpretation, or understanding that someone has of something like a document or 
testimony would be that person’s evidence. Further, Feldman and other philosophers 
believe that there are different types, or orders, of evidence. In his article, “Respecting the 
Evidence,” Feldman writes about two different kinds of evidence: first and second order.7 
Most of our evidence is first order. Jones goes to the store and buys groceries, forming 
beliefs based on of first order evidence along the way: he sees a tree, remembers the 
directions to the store, meditates on which brand of flour to buy, and so forth. Second 
order evidence is introduced when Jones gets evidence about his evidence, for example, 
when he learns that Smith disagrees with him on the directions to the store. 
 The various memories, conceptualizations, and impressions we have make up our 
reasons for believing things, and thus are our bodies of evidence, according Feldman. To 
rule out reasonable disagreement, all the relevant evidence must be shared. “Relevant” 
raises a few questions. We may not always know or be able to tell what evidence is 
                                                             
6 Feldman is an internalist; for him, reasons for a belief must be internally accessible to the person in 
question. 
7 Feldman, Richard. “Respecting the Evidence”. Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 19, Issue 1, 2005. Pp. 
95–119. 
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relevant. Relevant evidence would be evidence that should influence our attitude towards 
a certain proposition. It follows, then, that evidence that should influence our attitude 
towards other relevant evidence would also be relevant evidence. For a given belief, a 
very large body of relevant evidence could be involved. It may even be the case that the 
body of evidence for a given dispute could be much too large to manage, or take too long 
to sort through as an issue of practicality. Feldman would probably say that this problem 
can be solved by dividing large disagreements into smaller ones and working out the 
smaller ones one at a time. Dividing up large disagreements into many smaller ones may 
not be a very practical solution, but the issue at hand is whether it would be possible. Of 
course whether it is a reasonable expectation in the real world is still important. 
Assuming enough time and effort, though, even large bodies of evidence might be 
worked through, at least in principle. 
Feldman would not say that “all evidence must be shared.” Rather, Feldman 
argues that all the evidence relevant to the disagreement at hand must be shared. How do 
we know what evidence is and is not relevant? Relevant evidence should (epistemically 
speaking, not morally) influence an attitude towards the belief it is relevant to, whereas 
evidence that is not relevant should not. The obvious question becomes: how do we tell 
the difference? Here I draw a distinction between reasons and causes. It would be a 
mistake to conflate the two because they are not always synonymous, and Feldman is 
writing strictly about “reasons”. For example, consider a girl who forms a belief about 
God. She forms the belief due to the outside influences of her society, culture and family. 
When asked about her belief, she cannot name any reasons for holding the belief or cite 
any evidence for the belief. By her own admission, the belief was caused by forces 
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outside of herself. It would be safe to call her family, culture and society the causes of 
her belief, but not fair to call them her reasons for belief. Reasons are more than a simple 
causal relationship between a belief and its origin – they have justifications and indicate 
that a belief is true, while causes merely explain the fact of how the belief originated. 
Feldman, therefore, writes about reasons, not causes.  
Section II 
Feldman says that if two people do not judge each other as epistemic peers, they 
could still reasonably disagree because a discrepancy in peer status would sufficiently 
explain why they disagree. What exactly this peer status means, though, is not precisely 
stated by Feldman. Feldman says only that, “Let’s say two people are epistemic peers 
when they are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, background 
information, and so on.”8 It is clear from his argument, though, what epistemic peer must 
mean in order to make his argument valid. If two people in a disagreement could share all 
their evidence and still disagree, there must be some reason why. Either one of them is 
making a mistake or they are not peers, resulting in differing conclusions. An epistemic 
peer is someone, who, given the same body of evidence, would (unless making an error 
in reason) reach the same conclusion as someone else of equal peer status. Two people 
are epistemic peers when they are not different enough in terms of certain factors. These 
factors would be whichever ones, besides error, that could result in differing evaluations 
of a given body of evidence. Two epistemic peers with one body of evidence necessitates 
that if they have reached two contradictory conclusions, at least one of them made a 
                                                             
8 Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on 
Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 201. 
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mistake in reason. This definition is the one Feldman must commit himself to for his 
argument to be valid. It should work, but the question that remains unanswered is what 
exactly constitutes those “factors” – what makes a person evaluate a given body of 
evidence in a certain way. “Roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, 
background information, and so on,” is not precise enough. We need to know why exactly 
the two people would evaluate the evidence in the same way, what about them causes 
them to see things similarly. 
Adam Elga has written at length about the nature of epistemic peerhood. He 
describes peerhood as a relationship between two people that depends upon comparison 
of positions existing on a continuum from ignorance to expertise. He uses the example of 
a weather forecaster in his article, “Reflection and Disagreement,” to illustrate what 
would constitute an “expert” in regards to the weather.9 Elga states that the meteorologist 
is an expert (highly knowledgeable) and thusly should be deferred to by non-experts, who 
are not peers. Two meteorologists would be experts and peers. Two people untrained in 
meteorology would be non-experts and peers. Elga’s illustration brings up two interesting 
points. Firstly, being an epistemic peer is always in regards to something specific for 
Elga. Secondly, it follows that someone who is an expert on weather isn’t necessarily an 
expert on biology, meaning that the requirements for being someone’s epistemic peer are 
different depending on the situation. Now, it seems easy at first to define what constitutes 
an expert on weather: a degree in meteorology, experience correctly predicting the 
weather, and knowledge of the area one is predicting the weather for. Given Elga’s 
                                                             
9 Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs. Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2007. Pp. 478-502. 
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assessment of peerhood, putting someone on a continuum between ignorance and 
expertise on a subject is a good way to approximate that person’s peer status in relation to 
your own. Using his weather example, I would probably defer to a weather expert, call 
my friend who knows as much about weather as I do a peer, and evaluate an alien who 
has never experienced Earth weather less than a peer.  
Suppose we ask what makes someone an expert on American politics, though. 
Two people receive the same education and learn all the same things, but one has a 
conservative view while the other maintains a liberal one. Both have met the 
requirements of expertise, both have the same education, yet both disagree on some very 
fundamental propositions concerning their expertise, such as, “What system of 
government would best run our country?” They might disagree on the answer or even 
what the question means and so on. 
Recall the definition of epistemic peerhood that I gave for Feldman earlier. Would 
a conservative and a liberal be even remotely likely to come to the same conclusion about 
a proposition involving American politics? No, they would not. They would likely have 
completely different opinions on any number of questions involving what would be best, 
politically, for our country. We couldn’t chalk their consistent disagreement up to mere 
error – they have entirely different ways of seeing things. We can say now that being 
roughly equal in intelligence, reasoning ability, expertise, and so forth is not enough to 
constitute epistemic peers because two people could have all of those things in common 
and still be very likely to evaluate a body of evidence quite differently. Remember one 
term that Feldman used in his definition, “background information.” “Background 
information” now becomes very important depending on what it means. Given everything 
10 
 
said thus far, I take background information to mean something synonymous with 
background beliefs. In other words, two people must have similar background beliefs in 
order to be epistemic peers. To support this assumption, I argue that it fixes the problem 
of the experts on politics with differing views. 
Consider the liberal and the conservative again. If they had similar enough 
background beliefs in addition to all those other features we have discussed, then they 
would probably agree on propositions about American politics, because their background 
beliefs are what make them liberal or conservative. Applied to religious disagreements, 
the implications are straightforward: the atheist and theist would agree if their 
background beliefs were similar enough, because those background beliefs are part of 
what made them atheistic and theistic in the first place. The mere fact that one is an 
atheist and one is a theist gives each of them every reason to judge that they are not 
epistemic peers. This is not to say that either lacks in education, expertise, intelligence, 
reasoning, or in any other area, as I have shown that two people could have all those 
things in common and still evaluate evidence differently. No, an important component of 
epistemic peerhood must be background beliefs, which, when vastly different, means two 
parties are not peers. Since those background beliefs influence how current evidence is 
interpreted and evaluated, they must factor into peerhood. 
Suppose, then, that an atheist and a theist have shared all their evidence and still 
disagree about the existence of God. Each one judges the other to be sharing all the 
evidence relevant to the disagreement. Each one judges the other to be equally intelligent, 
equally rational, and equally educated. Still, the mere difference in their background 
beliefs means each is justified in assessing the other as not an epistemic peer. The 
11 
 
definition of peerhood needed to make Feldman’s argument valid results in the 
conclusion that two people who reach vastly different views about the world are not 
epistemic peers in the first place. His argument necessitates that “epistemic peers” are 
people who when given the same body of evidence would reach the same conclusion 
(barring error). But background beliefs are one such thing that could result in two people 
evaluating evidence differently. Therefore, two people in a religious disagreement would 
not be peers in the first place whenever background beliefs are involved in the evaluation 
of the body of evidence. So long as they deem each other not to be epistemic peers, they 
have every reason to assume their disagreement reasonable. 
Section III 
For Feldman, the reasonableness of a disagreement hinges greatly upon the 
sharing of evidence between the disagreeing parties. Until the relevant evidence has been 
shared, reasonable disagreement is still a possibility because two people working from 
two different bodies of evidence can conceivably reach contradictory conclusions 
reasonably. Once both parties have participated in full disclosure, they are supposedly 
working from the same body of evidence. By full disclosure, Feldman does not mean that 
two parties must share all the evidence they have about everything. It would be 
impractical and most likely impossible to share all of the evidence a person has. Instead, 
Feldman means that two parties need to share all the evidence that pertains to the 
disagreement (relevant evidence). By way of example, in a court hearing attorneys need 
only bring to trial witnesses and evidence that have to do with the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant and the charges that have been brought against him. Other evidence, either 
pertaining to someone else’s guilt, or the defendant’s guilt on some other issue, would be 
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unnecessary. The two parties are not necessarily working from the “same” body of 
evidence in the sense that they truly share all evidence. But they do and must share all of 
the evidence that either party is using to make her decision.  
From here, many philosophers begin to focus on whether two people who 
disagree and have shared all of their evidence can remain reasonable by asking questions 
such as, “Should I give equal weight to my opponent’s view as I do to my own?”101112 
These arguments often hinge on the intuition that disagreement alone shouldn’t always 
reduce someone’s confidence in her own beliefs and are a response to the arguments that 
peer disagreement is enough to decrease the confidence we have in our own beliefs. A 
proponent of such an argument might give the example of two friends, one of whom 
spots someone in a crowd, but whom the other friend insists is not there. The first friend, 
rather than considering his friend equally likely to be right and thusly lowering his own 
confidence, might simply assume that he possesses some insight that his friend does not. 
Instead of taking this route, I would like the address questions as to whether all the 
evidence can really be shared in the first place. While the conversation in philosophy 
tends to go in the direction of asking questions about the fact that two people disagree, I 
would like to ask whether these two people can ever get to the point of working from the 
same body of evidence. 
                                                             
10 Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs. Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2007. Pp. 478–502. 
 
11 Kelly, Thomas. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Ed. 
Hawthorne, John and Gendler, Tamar. Vol. 1, 2005. 
 
12 Sosa, Earnest. “The Epistemology of Disagreement”. (Forthcoming) The Epistemology of Disagreement: 
New Essays. Ed. Lackey, Jennifer and Christensen, David. 
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        What does it mean to share evidence? Is it as simple as handing someone a file or 
telling that person something? Feldman does not give a specific account on this matter, 
but it is a very important question. Suppose that Smith and Jones disagree about whether 
it is six o’clock or seven o’clock. To convince Jones, Smith tells him that his watch reads, 
“Seven o’clock.” Telling Jones that it is Seven o’clock seems like the most 
straightforward way for Smith to share his evidence with Jones. 
        Several questions need to be answered, though. Has Smith just shared his evidence 
with Jones? Suppose Jones doesn't speak English. In this case Smith hasn't. Jones does 
not understand the statement. His failure to understand a statement in a language he 
doesn’t know could reveal a deeper problem. What about more subtle cases? What if 
Jones hears Smith and understands, but distrusts Smith’s watch? Or, what if he 
"understands," but in a different way than Smith does (Some people don’t read the exact 
time from a clock, but instead round off to the nearest hour. When Jones hears “seven 
o’clock,” he doesn’t know whether Smith really means seven or seven o’ five)? People 
can hear one statement and derive two different understandings. If we take different 
meanings from the same evidence, do we really have the same evidence? Recall that 
when Feldman uses the term “evidence,” he doesn’t mean the physical watch that reads 
“seven o’clock.” He doesn’t even mean the spoken words of Smith, “seven o’clock.” 
Feldman would call only Smith’s and Jones’ understanding of the watch and statement as 
evidence, the understanding being the only thing each of them can really have internally. 
What if the background experiences and evidence we use to interpret new evidence 
causes us to often see that evidence in different ways, then? We could be starting worlds 
apart from the onset, having different understandings of all the physical data we take in. 
14 
 
Here, Feldman would argue that Jones would be misunderstanding Smith because of 
background beliefs that are too different. Obviously, two people with background 
information too dissimilar will not be able to have an intelligible conversation of any 
type, which would prohibit them from resolving any type of disagreement. Feldman 
would say that background beliefs are part of peerhood, and that these background beliefs 
must be similar enough in order for them to interpret evidence the same way, else 
reasonable disagreement can and will occur just as I’ve outlined. The principle that we 
take away here, though, is that for sharing of evidence to occur, it takes more than a mere 
account of your evidence in order to share that evidence. The evidence must also be 
understood such that it results in the two parties having the same body of evidence, or at 
least two bodies close enough that it would prohibit reasonable disagreement. 
Suppose that Jones takes the same meaning from Smith’s testimony that Smith 
intends and has similar background beliefs. Also suppose that Jones takes the evidence as 
truthful. If Smith has just shared his only reason for believing the time is seven o’clock, 
and if Jones has no reasons for his belief (although this may be hard to imagine), Smith 
and Jones would now be working from the same body of evidence. If Jones is convinced 
by the evidence, then they have avoided disagreement altogether. If Jones is not, then 
they may have still avoided reasonable disagreement, as Smith may be able to demote 
Jones from peer status. If Smith has “sufficient reason” (what constitutes “sufficient” 
here is disputable) to believe Jones is incapable of understanding or properly evaluating 
the evidence for some reason, Smith can demote him. If Smith judges him to be a peer, 
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though, then suspense of judgment is the appropriate attitude they should both adopt and 
they have still avoided a reasonable disagreement.13 
        In the above example and in examples like it, where two people evaluate evidence in 
the same way, and take the same meaning from evidence, Feldman should be right in that 
they can only reach one valid conclusion. The evidence being shared was fully shared 
and shared with the same understanding of that evidence. The proposition, “seven 
o’clock” meant the same thing to both Smith and Jones. All beliefs formed and evaluated 
in this way between two parties should be easily and correctly examined. The question is 
whether this hypothetical example is representative of real disagreements. 
        Evidence can mean the same thing to anyone who has it and fully shares linguistic 
systems of semantics and syntax, as well as all the same background beliefs and any other 
factors influencing the understanding of that evidence. Just what are we really asserting 
when we make such a claim, though? All that this claim means is that if two people think 
and understand things in the same exact way, or in a “close enough” way, they will 
understand a specific thing in the same way. Is this not obvious, though? Imagine two 
people who are exactly alike. Of course if they are independently introduced with the 
same evidence they will interpret it the same way (barring random chance errors). They 
will do this because they are the same person. To interpret the same evidence differently, 
they would need to at least have somewhat different background beliefs or different 
bodies of evidence. I will argue next that given even two people with this level of 
                                                             
13 Whether and under what conditions “peer demotion” can or should occur is not a topic I will address 
here. 
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similarity, if one of the two has one type of evidence, she may be unable to share it with 
her peer. 
 What could stop someone who is a peer from being able to share evidence? 
Suppose I am in a disagreement over the ontological argument and I remember that I was 
convinced by what Plantinga had to say about it at a philosophy convention. Now 
suppose that I am, in fact, able to recall what he said, and why it convinced me of his 
position. Finally, suppose I now try to convey this argument to my friend with whom I 
am in a disagreement. I am a timid speaker and my friend is imposing. Try as I might, I 
am intimidated by his sharp wit and self-assuredness. When I try to argue with him, I feel 
uneasy, and words escape me. So, despite my best efforts, my retelling of Plantinga’s 
argument does not do Plantinga’s account justice. After hearing my account, my friend 
decides that Plantinga’s argument is not good evidence for believing the ontological 
argument. Have I fully shared my evidence with my friend? The answer seems to be no. 
For us to fully share the evidence, my friend and I need the same understanding of 
Plantinga. Whether it is possible for us to have an exactly similar understanding of 
something as complex as Plantinga’s ontological argument is another puzzle entirely, so 
assume what is needed is a “close enough” understanding of Plantinga. By “close 
enough” I mean close enough so that it doesn’t make a difference in interpretation or 
evaluation of relevant evidence. Given that, it still seems possible that I could fail to 
convey all of my relevant information. By that I simply mean that it could be possible for 
someone to have evidence that person would not be fully able to express. Feldman might 
respond that in an ideal situation, everyone involved is adequately capable of expressing 
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his evidence. Feldman can be granted this ideal situation with some hesitation.14 At least 
some religious disagreements involve two people calmly and adequately conveying the 
evidence in a way that does what someone else said justice. 
 Here lies the trick, though. Is all evidence the kind of evidence that could be fully 
shared in an ideal situation, like repeating something said by another? Consider Smith 
and Jones again, who, as it turns out, are police officers. Both are narcotics agents who 
regularly deal with drug cases. At some point, though, Jones heads down a dark road and 
begins stealing evidence and selling drugs on the side, for which he ends up in jail. 
Smith, being Jones’ good friend, comes to visit him. The two of them converse for a 
while, and eventually the inevitable comes up. Jones tells Smith that it is very bad being 
in jail. To kill time, Smith asks how bad jail is. Jones begins to go into great detail about 
how the prison guards rampantly violate the personal rights of the inmates. Smith is less 
than convinced and says as much. Indignant, Jones replies, “You have no idea what it is 
like on this side of the bars.” 
 Even though Jones has gone into great detail about how the prison guards violate 
the personal rights of inmates, it may be the case that he has not fully shared his evidence 
with Smith. The thing Jones is drawing on as evidence here is his experience of living in 
prison. What Jones has as evidence is different than what Smith has as evidence. Jones is 
thinking of an event, perception, or something that happened to him. Smith is thinking 
about what Jones has told him, perhaps imagining being in Jones’ position. Part of the 
evidence in play is the experience that Jones had in prison. Jones’ experience is 
                                                             
14 While such a situation can be granted for the sake of argument, it is debatable as to whether under 
most circumstances we could actually fully and completely articulate our reasons for complex beliefs. 
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qualitatively different than Smith’s knowledge about Jones’ experience, and there is no 
way to change that fact. Remember again that Feldman conceptualizes evidence as an 
understanding of something rather than the actual thing.15 Add to this concept of evidence 
the fact that Smith’s understanding of Jones’ experience and Jones’ understanding of his 
own experience will never be the same.  
 When Jones attempts to share his experience of prison, all he can really provide is 
a testimony about his evidence. The new evidence is introduced for Smith’s sake, so that 
Smith can get an idea of what evidence Jones is working from. It is not, by any means, 
the same evidence that Jones has. We could try to state Jones’ evidence as a proposition 
that captures its meaning for both Smith and Jones. Suppose we say, “Jones had the 
experience of prison guards violating the rights of the inmates,” or, “Jones perceived the 
prison guards as violating the rights of inmates.” Do we now have a statement that can 
capture what both Smith and Jones think? What we really have, in truth, are two different 
facts, neither of which captures Jones’ evidence. First, from Jones’ perspective, Jones had 
an experience. From Smith’s perspective, he has the knowledge of the fact that Jones had 
an experience. Even though they can (perhaps) agree on the above propositions, the fact 
remains that they have not yet shared all the evidence. For that to happen, Smith would 
have to have had Jones’ exact experience. 
 What would it take for Smith to have Jones’ experience? Even two people seeing 
the same thing are seeing it from slightly different angles and are seeing it as two 
different people (peer status, background beliefs), making each experience unique. 
                                                             
15 Feldman recognizes experience as evidence. What is in question here is how experiential evidence is 
uniquely difficult to share, not whether it is evidence in the first place. 
19 
 
Consider a further thought experiment to illustrate. Suppose Smith ends up also stealing 
and goes to prison. Suppose that Smith and Jones are at the same prison, and are even 
cellmates. For all intents and purposes, they are experiencing close to the same thing. 
Maybe Smith will now agree with Jones, but maybe he won’t. Why wouldn’t he? Smith 
still wouldn’t be having the same exact experience as Jones. He would be experiencing 
prison as Smith. That is a different experience than experiencing prison as Jones. What 
would it look like for them to actually share the experience? Is there a conceivable way 
for Smith to truly share Jones’ experience? It may be that Smith and Jones cannot do that, 
no matter how much they may desire. Smith might try to amalgamate two of his 
experiences together to get some idea of what Jones’ experience was like, but this 
amalgamation doesn’t mean Smith had Jones’ exact experience by any stretch of the 
imagination. Experiences may not be the type of thing that two people can really share. 
 We could try taking the thought experiment even further. Suppose that instead of 
going to prison with Jones, Smith tries a new experimental device that beams Jones’ 
perceptions into Smith’s brain. For a few days, Smith sits on a couch and takes in Jones’ 
daily experience of prison. After all this, Smith may change his mind, or he may still 
remain unconvinced. What could explain his failure to concede? Even though Smith is 
now experiencing what Jones experiences, he is doing so as Smith and not Jones. He is 
Smith experiencing Jones in prison, which is different from Jones experiencing Jones in 
prison. Can the thought experiment be stretched far enough to make their experiences 
identical? It looks like the only way to do this would be if the machine could somehow 
cause Smith to stop being aware of being Smith, and think he is Jones having Jones’ 
experience of jail. Aha! Now Smith agrees with Jones, at least for as long as he remains 
20 
 
unaware of being Smith! But wait! Now we have arrived right back where we did at the 
outset: that Smith would only certainly agree with Jones if they were the same person. Of 
course Jones and Jones would agree on Jones’ experience. Apart from mind-melding, 
though, they could still disagree about a subjective experience. And there lies the 
problem with Feldman’s argument. When experience becomes an essential part of a 
disagreement, two people would only certainly agree if they were the same person, which 
is already obvious.  Since it wouldn’t make sense to disregard any and all evidence that 
comes from subjective experience, that evidence really does bear on the disagreement 
and can force a disagreement to remain reasonable so long as it is the type that it cannot 
have a shared understanding. 
 The point I am making here is similar to the one I made in Section II. Two 
epistemic peers would evaluate the same body of evidence in the same way. On a 
fundamental level, though, the body of evidence can change depending on the person 
experiencing it. This experience, if it does make a difference, cannot be ignored, and 
Smith and Jones have reason to believe they are involved with different bodies of 
evidence by virtue of the fact that they are two different people, even though they are two 
different people experiencing the same thing. Smith experiencing prison is different than 
Jones experiencing prison. The atheist’s experience of reality is different and not 
interchangeable with the theist’s experience of reality. 
 Can’t much of our experiential evidence be shared, though? After all, it is very 
often the case that we hear those words of encouragement, “I know how that feels.” Do 
we usually doubt such comforting words? We do when we doubt the person speaking 
them really understands or can relate to the experience we have had, but often we feel 
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that other people really do know what it is like to feel how we feel. As long as the 
understanding is “close enough,” maybe we could still be working from the same body of 
experience. Feldman might say that while the experience cannot be shared, an account 
could be given of that experience which could convey all the necessary information. 
Suppose that Smith and Jones are male and female, respectively. Smith complains to 
Jones about how he is tired of how women complain about how much harder it is to 
compete for jobs in today’s world. In reply, Jones says something like, “You don’t know 
what it is like to be a woman in today’s world.” Doesn’t Jones have a point? Maybe the 
only way for Smith to know what it is like to be a woman, is for Smith to be a woman. If 
Smith were to take classes in women’s studies, read a few books on the civil rights 
movement, listen to Jones’ description of being a woman and in general learn what 
prominent women have written down in books about their experience, but could still 
learn something new by becoming a woman, there may be something to say for 
experience as being unique as evidence. If no amount of physical information can fully 
account for the difference in Smith and Jones’ experience, then their evidence can never 
be fully shared in matters where experience is a decisive factor. 
 In cases where someone claims to know “how that feels,” usually some similar 
experience of the person making the claim is involved. If Smith is downtrodden because 
his parents are getting a divorce, Jones might say that she knows how Smith feels because 
Jones’ parents also got divorced. Their experience is at least similar. But when Smith 
tries to relate to Jones’ experience of being a woman, he draws a blank. Save really being 
a woman, there is no experience close to Jones’. 
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 How experiential evidence applies to religious disagreements has to do with 
whether the experiences that religious people have can be related to by those who are not 
religious, and vice versa. In our prison thought experiment, it wouldn’t be unreasonable 
to assume that if Smith and Jones were in prison together, their experience of prison life 
would be close enough that they could agree on what does and does not go on in prison. 
In other situations, like knowing “what it is like being a woman,” the situation is not so 
clear-cut because unlike prison, someone cannot simply become a woman in order to 
share the experience. Are religious experiences more like the former or the latter? Is 
disbelief in God like going through a rough breakup and belief like falling in love, 
something that most people can relate to? Or, are belief and disbelief in God more like 
being male or female; are they experiences that, despite great effort, cannot be 
manufactured for the sake of a disagreement? Religious beliefs, by their very nature, are 
often beliefs formed about and around and to explain the meaning of experiences had. 
They are also quite often very personal. They aren’t necessarily always going to be 
formed in that way, of course. At least in theory, I can imagine someone who, for 
instance, believes in the existence of God based entirely upon the cosmological argument. 
Suppose this person meets an atheist who also knows and understands the cosmological 
argument. These two people could probably sit down and discuss the evidence for and 
against the cosmological argument, what the argument does and does not show, and rule 
out reasonable disagreement. All of the evidence the believer had about God would be 
evidence that could be fully shared with the atheist. At least in this example, all the 
evidence could be shared. But such a case doesn’t seem to be the norm – many people 
hold religious beliefs on the grounds of other things besides classical arguments. 
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  Belief in God is formed in different ways, making matters tricky. People believe 
in God for a variety of reasons: some are taught as children to accept that God exists as a 
matter of fact and have only the testimony of those they trust as evidence. Some say that 
belief in God is formed on a very basic level, and that to cease believing the individual 
needs to be proven wrong. Some claim their belief in God is entirely to do with 
arguments for God’s existence, such as the cosmological argument. Some may claim that 
something like the Bible proves that God exists. Some even claim to have experienced 
miraculous events that have radically changed their perceptions of reality and belief in 
God. Most would probably cite some other form of  less exciting experiential evidence 
like encountering the presence of God or feeling a deep oceanic sensation that convinces 
the person having the experience that God is real. 
 This final group that points to miraculous events or religious experience has 
experienced something that creates an epistemic gap. In these cases, experience that 
cannot be shared is central to the argument. In some cases, perhaps the atheist used to 
believe and claims to have had a similar experience to the theist. While at first glance this 
experience seems to solve the problem, it really just reintroduces it. Now, the atheist has 
an experience that the theist cannot relate to: having ceased to believe in God, or, 
experiencing something that caused belief based on experience to end. The theist might 
say something like, “experiencing what I do now, I cannot fathom what it would be like 
to cease believing in God or what the experience that could cause such a change in belief 
would be like.” The two are in the same boat they were in before, then, and reasonable 
disagreement is the only avenue. 
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 For the most part, though, when the theist explains having had some sort of 
religious experience that is convincing enough to be a reason for belief in God, how does 
the atheist relate? If the experience is as described, then it seems the atheist would change 
beliefs if the atheist also had the experience. But accepting that at face value would be 
unsatisfactory because in most situations the atheist probably cannot imagine such a 
feeling or experience, and certainly has not had a similar experience – the atheist cannot 
relate to the theist in any way. Here, the theist has evidence that is central and crucial to 
the belief the theist has in God, and the evidence cannot be shared with the atheist. The 
atheist can try to imagine what it must be like for the theist to have had such an 
experience, but such an imagination is different than the actual experience of the theist 
because the atheist has no idea whether his interpretation is accurate. Even if the atheist 
wants desperately to know what the theist experienced, that information is 
nontransferable. The two are left with only the option of reasonable disagreement. The 
theist does not know whether the experience would change the atheist’s evaluation of the 
evidence and neither does the atheist because to know that, the atheist would have to have 
that experience. Maybe having the experience would change the atheist’s mind, maybe it 
wouldn’t, but without that knowledge, reasonable disagreement is the best option. This 
problem could be generalized to other disagreements, but it is especially true of cases like 
religious disagreement. In everyday life we have experiences that can be related to one 
another, but in cases like religious experience, one person has an experience the other 
simply cannot relate to. 
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Section IV 
 Feldman wrote his article in response, at least to some degree, to the puzzling 
nature of the disagreements he witnessed between his own students. He reasoned that if 
his students were epistemic peers and shared all their evidence then they shouldn’t be 
able to hold the sort of common sense position they had that they were all being 
reasonable, because the uniqueness thesis rules out such a conclusion – someone has to 
be wrong. 
 Feldman’s mistake is not necessarily that if his students are peers and share their 
evidence they should change their attitude – he could be granted this, in my opinion, 
because the implications are so limited. His students are not epistemic peers and they are 
not able to share all the relevant evidence they are using to form their beliefs. Some of the 
students might not be peers by virtue of their respective intelligence or education or 
ability to evaluate evidence. Some of the students might be unintentionally withholding 
evidence, omitting something that is affecting held beliefs. Some of their asymmetry 
cannot be avoided, though. Many of the students have reason to judge each other as not 
being epistemic peers, not because one is smarter than the other, but rather because their 
starting points are too vastly different to be compatible – they aren’t on the same “page”. 
Many of the students also have evidence they cannot share with their peers. Any evidence 
that is experiential in nature will change as it changes hands – becoming a testimony of 
something the peer has never experienced and cannot relate to. This exchange isn’t a real 
sharing of evidence and cannot be one. 
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 Interestingly, Feldman gives an account of what an “apparent” reasonable 
disagreement might go like: 
After examining this evidence, I find in myself an inclination, perhaps a strong 
inclination, to think that this evidence supports P. It may even be that I can’t help 
but believe P. But I see that another person, every bit as sensible and serious as I, 
has an opposing reaction. Perhaps this person has some bit of evidence that cannot 
be shared, or perhaps he takes the evidence differently than I do. It’s difficult to 
know everything about his mental life and thus difficult to tell exactly why he 
believes as he does. One of us must be making some kind of mistake or failing to 
see some truth. But I have no basis for thinking that the one making the mistake is 
him rather than me. And the same is true of him. And in that case, the right thing 
for both of us to do is to suspend judgment on P. 16 
My argument is that as long as either party has reason to believe that someone has 
possession of “some bit of evidence that cannot be shared,” there is good reason why two 
peers could disagree. Further, so long as two people disagree on P, even if they are 
“every bit as sensible and serious” as each other and of equal education, they have good 
reason to believe they are not epistemic peers if they have differing background beliefs, 
which could contribute to why they disagree on P in the first place. So long as they do 
not judge each other to be epistemic peers, there is good reason why they disagree on P. 
 Feldman argued that his students could not reasonably disagree if they were 
epistemic peers and shared all of their relevant evidence. He concluded: “I cannot make 
good sense of the supportive attitude my students displayed.”17 I argue that his students 
are not really epistemic peers because they have different background beliefs and that 
                                                             
16 Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on 
Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 194‐214. and the 
Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 212. 
17 Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on 
Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 213. 
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they cannot share all of their evidence because much of it is experiential. I conclude that 
Feldman is wrong in that his students may very well call their disagreements reasonable. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Bibliography 
Clifford, William. “The Ethics of Belief”. Philosophy of Religion Selected 
Readings. Ed. Peterson, Michael; Hasker, William; Reichenbach, Bruce; Basinger, 
David.  New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 99-104. 
Elga, Adam. “Reflection and Disagreement”. Noûs. Vol. 41, Issue 3, 2007. Pp. 
478–502. 
Feldman, Richard. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Philosophers Without 
Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Ed. Antony, Louise. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 194-214. 
Feldman, Richard. “Respecting the Evidence”. Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 
19, Issue 1, 2005. Pp. 95–119. 
Kelly, Thomas. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”. Oxford Studies in 
Epistemology. Ed. Hawthorne, John and Gendler, Tamar. Vol. 1, 2005. 
McGrew, Timothy. “Evidence”. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Ed. 
Bernecker, Sven and Pritchard, Duncan. Pp. 58-68. 
Sosa, Earnest. “The Epistemology of Disagreement”. (Forthcoming) The 
Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Ed. Lackey, Jennifer and Christensen, 
David. 
Thune, Michael. “Religious Belief and the Episetemology of Disagreement”. 
Philosophical Compass. May, 2010. Pp. 712-724. 
29 
 
Wedgwood, Ralph. “The Moral Evil Demons”. Disagreement. Ed. Feldman, 
Richard and Warfield, Ted A. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 217-246. 
